BASIC NOTES
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
11 August 2005
Preliminary analysis of E3/EU proposal to Iran
By Paul Ingram
"a lot of gift wrapping around a pretty empty box"
-undisclosed EU diplomat, quoted in Reuters, 27 July 2005
This is a preliminary analysis of the full
E3/EU 'Framework for a Long-Term Agreement' presented to Iran
on 5 August 2005. The IAEA Board decision today to request Iran
to reverse its decision and suspend its enrichment process makes
it all the more important that the Europeans reconsider and strengthen
their offer to the Iranians to maximise the chance of a positive
resolution to this stand off.
In general this document is vague on incentives and heavy on
demands. It proposes new processes of further dialogue with
the potential for cooperation in a number of areas, but few concrete
offers. The demands upon Iran in contrast are specific and uncompromising.
The language and speed of the Iranian response suggests they either
feel betrayed by the E3/EU's perceived failure to offer more significant
incentives or that they had predetermined to reject any offer which
did not show flexibility on the crucial question of uranium enrichment.
Given the strength of Iranian statements over the last few months
that have indicated their intention to exercise their perceived
right to the nuclear fuel cycle has been incumbent upon the E3/EU
to offer significant and specific incentives to persuade Iran not
to follow this path. In any event, their proposal is not
impressive.
Given that the demands made of Iran opt for the most extensive
and complete shut-down of Iran's current nuclear fuel cycle activities,
the document appears designed to fit closely with US requirements.
Although the document talks of building trust between Europe and
Iran, there is little within it that offers a great deal of trust
at this stage, even when that trust would not require significant
risk. Even the establishment of a buffer store of nuclear fuel is
proposed to be physically located in a third country, rather than
in Iran under safeguards. The E3/EU do not seem to have had the
courage to offer either the substantial, detailed incentives or
a creative, compromise solution on enrichment which could reasonably
have been expected to receive Iran's endorsement.
The offers
The significant EU incentives appear to be:
1. Granting access to "the international nuclear technologies
market where contracts are awarded on the basis of open competitive
tendering" to which Iran has hitherto been barred and allowing
Iran to export nuclear technology under certain controls.
2. A draft EU/Iran Trade and Cooperation agreement and Political
Dialogue Agreement.
3. An assured supply of nuclear fuel for Iranian reactors from
Russia, based on a unspecified framework to be negotiated.
4. Unspecified support for the development of Iran's civil nuclear
programme, and negotiations on an agreement between Iran and EURATOM.
5. A general commitment to work with Iran to develop regional
security arrangements and confidence-building measures, which
could prove of value to Iran.
6. Continued support for Iranian accession to the WTO.
The efficacy of these incentives lies in the detail, but the detail
is far from well advanced. Other offers are made within the document,
but look still less substantial. For example, the E3/EU offer contains
security assurances, but these are simply reaffirmed international
obligations. To be meaningful in taking away Iranian strategic incentives
to possess nuclear weapons, such security assurances would need
to include the US, and go further towards a more watertight non-aggression
pact that involved criteria on the deployment of forces within the
region. If the experience at May's NPT conference is anything to
go by, the Iranians will be asking what concrete assurances they
can be given that EU members are abiding by their own commitments
towards nuclear disarmament referred to in the E3/EU document, given
existing UK and French plans to continue deploying nuclear weapons.
The reaffirmed support from the E3/EU for an effective and verifiable
Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery will be welcomed by Iran. But the Iranians will be asking
what Europe proposes to do about undeniable Israeli deployment of
hundreds of nuclear warheads within the region if they are to avoid
accusations of double-standards and demonstrate they are serious
about such an objective.
Other offers of cooperation in confidence-building measures and
regional security arrangements, in trade and investment development,
in economic and technical cooperation, and in tackling issues such
as terrorism and drug trafficking will be welcomed as significant.
However, they will not be seen by the Iranians as incentives linked
to the abandonment of nuclear facilities, but rather foreign policy
collaboration that benefits both sides and should be on the agenda
in any case.
The
demands
In contrast,
the demands made of Iran are a great deal more clear and specific:
1. That Iran makes "a binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle
activities other than the construction and operation of light
water power and research reactors." This means no uranium conversion,
or enrichment, no fuel reprocessing and the closure of the heavy
water reactor at Arak. The EU3 clearly recognises that this implies
the shut-down of major facilities including Natanz and Isfahan,
and the loss of a substantial capital investment, so promises
to "establish a group to identify alternative uses for the equipment,
installations, facilities and materials".
2. Resolution
of all questions raised under Iran's Safeguards Agreement and
Additional Protocol, and continued cooperation with the IAEA,
with all facilities under safeguards under all circumstances.
3. Ratify
the NPT Additional Protocol by the end of 2005, and in the meantime
to fully implement it.
4. Agree to
arrangements for the supply of nuclear fuel elements from outside
Iran and their return to the supplier after their use in the reactor.
5. Strict
national export controls under UNSCR 1540 based on international
norms, with assistance from EU officials in setting up procedures.
6. A legally-binding
commitment not to leave the NPT.
Conclusion
It is not too late for the commitments within the document to be
developed further by the E3/EU, but it would be a mistake for them
to believe the ball is in the Iranian court. While many EU demands
are reasonable, the key sticking point remains the demand to abandon
all fuel-cycle activities. If the EU were prepared to compromise
upon this particular point in return for compliance with other demands,
the negotiations would be on a good deal more solid ground.
On the other hand, the undiplomatic language in the official Iranian
response to the Framework Agreement shows more than just a widening
gap between the two sides. It has the whiff of finality about it
and suggests that Iran is now unlikely to change its mind, irrespective
of what the EU may now put on the table. The Iranian
two-page response contains no conciliatory statements whatsoever,
but adopts a hard line from start ("The proposal presented by the
E3/EU on August 5, 2005 is a clear violation of international law
and the Charter of the United Nations, the NPT, Tehran Statement
and the Paris Agreement of November 15, 2004") to finish ("It amounts
to an insult on the Iranian nation, for which the E3 should apologize").
This may suggest that the damage of a weak E3/EU response is irreversible.
However, further negotiations are the only viable game in town,
and both sides should swallow hard, restrain from actions that will
further exacerbate tensions and continue the ongoing process. Indeed,
the messages from Tehran have been mixed. In contrast to the official
response, Mohammed Ahmadinejad, the Iranian President, said yesterday
that he was about to make his own proposals. They ought now to abide
by the IAEA Board's request today to resume their suspension of
enrichment activities and reinstate the seals on the equipment at
Isfahan. But it is also now time that the Europeans raised the negotiations
and involved heads of state in a summit to hammer out proposals
that could be mutually beneficial.
The chances of persuading Iran that their future does not lie in
a full nuclear power programme will also be dramatically weakened
if EU states and the US themselves decide to expand their own nuclear
power programmes.
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Paul Ingram is Senior Analyst at the British American Security
Information Council (BASIC).
E-mail address: pingram at basicint.org
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